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IN THE

Supreme Court
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
CAr>:iTOL ELECTRIC CO·MP ANY,
a co-partnership,
Appellant,

CASE
NO.

vs.

7194
S US_.:\_X 11.

C_._~MPBELL,

Respondent. BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case is one in which plaintiff sought to recover
under the mechanic's lien statute for labor, material and
equipment installed in the building owned by the defendant. The labor, material and equipment were used
and expended in altering, repairing and remodeling the
electrical wiring and equipment in defendant's building.
By plaintiff's complaint it sought to recover the sum of
Five Hundred Fifty-Two and 33/100 Dollars ($552.33)
\rith interest at the rate of six p~ercent (6%) per annum
from April 24, 1946 and the sum of Twenty-Five Dollars
1
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($25.00) attorneys fees and costs and prayed that said
sun1s be adjudged a lien upon the premises and land of
the defendant and that the sarne be foreclos~ed and that it
have execution for any deficiency. (Transcript pages 1
to 5)
Defendant by answer made a general denial of all the
allegations of the complaint except the co-partnership
of the plaintiff and the residence of the defendant in
Salt Lake County, Utah which were admitted. (Transcript Page 20)
Plaintiff sought to hold defendant responsible· and
to have and foreclose a lien on defendant's property on
the theory that defendant's husband, David J. Camp~
bell, with whom plaintiff had its dealings, was the agent
of defendant. (Paragraph II of plaintiff's complaint.
Transcript Page 1)
All the witnesses heard by the court were called by
plaintiff and all exhibits were introduced by plaintiff and
defendant called no witnesses nor introduced any exhibits. Defendant was ·called as a witness by plaintiff. At
the conclusion of plaintiff's case, defendant rested.
(rrranscript Page 72)
Judge Van Cott entered his order that defendant
have judgment against the plaintiff "no cause of action." (Transcript Page 28)
By findings of fact all issues were found in favor
of the plaintiff except that of agency between defendant
and her husband, David J. Campbell and the· court found
2
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that David J. l\uupbell \vas not the duly authorized
agent of the defendant and that the plaintiff did not sell
dte electrical supplies and furnish labor to David J.
Can1pbell as the duly authorized agent of the defendant
but sold said electrical supplies and furnished said labor
to David J. Can1pbell and relied solely on the credit of
DaYid J. Can1pbell. (Findings 3. Transcript Page 31) The
court concluded that David J .. Campbell was not acting
as the duly authorized agent of the def,endant and that
defendant ,,~as entitled to a judgment of no cause of
action. (Conclusions 1 and 2. Transcript Pages 31 and 32)
Juclgn1ent was made and entered against the plaintiff
no cause for action. (Transcript Page 29)
The defendant, Susan M. Campbell, testified that on
the 14th day of February, 1946 (which was the day the
work was -commenced and first materials furnished,
(Transcript Page 4. Exhibit D) ) she did not know that
she owned the property upon which the work was p~e~r
formed and for which materials were furnished. That
the property was put in her name without her sanction.
That she did not take any interest in the property. (Transcript Page 43) That she had nothing to do with the
property other than signing the property hack to- the
Inan her husband bought it from after the death of her
husband and after the commencement of this action on
October 31, 1947. (Transcript Page 44. Exhibit A) That
~he discovered that she owned the property before Mr.
Campbell died because he told her so and that he could
not borrow the money unless he put the property in her
narne and that \vas the only reason he put the property in
I
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her na1ne. (Transcript Page 45) That Mr. Ca1npbell
Inanaged the property, collected the rent, paid the taxes
as far as she knew, and that she did not take any interest
in it at all. ·That she heard her. husband say something
about the remodeling of the property during the period,
February 14, 1946 to April 24, 1946, but that she was
not on the property and did riot have anything to do with
the property. 'That Mr. Campbell ·entered into a contract to sell the property to a man named Harold Brinton. (Transcript Page 48) That she signed papers for
sale of the property to 1\fr. Brinton on the 1st day of
April, 1946, including agreement to make repairs to the
property. (Transcript Page 49. Exhibit C) That she
permitted Mr. Campbell to manage other properties for
her because she could not do anything else about it.
(Trans-cript Page 51) That she did not herself register
the property in question with the O·P A. That she knew
nothing about it and was never in the place in her life.
That the only interest she had in the property was that
it was in her name. That 1\;lr. Campbell took care of it
and did everything he wanted to have done wi·th it. (Transcript Page 53) That Mr. Campbell had her authority
to do with the property what he wanted to do. That she
did not have a thing to do with it, did not have any interest in it, did not want to have anything to do with the
property and did not want him to put anything in her
name be-cause she did not want to get into trouble.
(Transcript Page 54)
James W. Latimer, a partner in the Capitol Electric
Company, admittedly performed the work and furnished
1naterials at the request of David J. Campbell. Mr. CampSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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bell told hilu he had purchased the property involved in
thi~ action. ( Tran8eript Page ti2)
That he dealt with
1Lr. Ca1npbell all the tin1e. ( Transcriprt Page 63) That
he charged the aeeonnt to nlr. Ca1nphell (Transcript Page
6-±)
~Ir.

Lindsay C. :\leeks, \vho worked on the job, saw
DaYid J. Ca1np'bell on the premises nearly every day
and that ~lr. Crunpbell \Yas looking over the work done
and having the work done the- way he wanted it done
and that he did not see defendant on the premises. (Tran~cript Page 66)
~Ir.

Harold Burbidge Brinton on April 1, 1948 entered into a contract in writing to purchase the property
(Transcript Page 68. Exhibit C.) David J. Crunphell
and Susan ~L Campbell, his wife, the defendant, were
designated as the sellers and Harold Burbidge Brinton
and Anna C. Brinton, his wife, were designated as the
buyers. Attached to and as part of the contract was an
agreeinent for remodeling and making certain repairs to
the property by David J. Campbell. Both the contract
and the agreement were signed by David J. Campbell
and the defendant, Susan ~J. Campbell. The agreement
provided in part: '• This agreement entered into this 1st
day of April, 1946 by and between David J. Campbell of
.J1urray, Utah, and Harold Burbidge Brinton of Salt Lake
City, for certain specified repairs detailed herein to the
buildings designated and known as 729 and 731 North
~n<l West Street, Salt Lake City, Utah", and "Mr. Camphell agrees that all of the above work will be done with

s
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

good Inaterials and rn a good workmanlike manner;"·
(Exhibit C)
The agreement (Exhibit C) made no mention of the
electrical work, that work having been commenced on
]j'ehruary 14, 1946 and having been completed on April,
26, 1946, (Transcript Page 4) and was thus practically
cornpleted on April 1, 1946 when the agreement was
signed. (Transcript Page 70)
1tlr. Campbell negotiated the sale of the property to
1\Ir. Brinton for his wife, the defendant, ('Transcript
Page 69) he having called on Mr. Brinton several days
and weeks before, (Transcript Page 70) and Mr. Brinton
saw Mrs. Campbell the first time about the first. of April
\vhen they entered into the contract. ('Transcript Page
69) 'That he gave the first payment on the contract to
Mr. Campbell and that Mrs. Campbell was not present.
(Transcript Page 69)

STATEMENT OF ERRORS
Appellant relies upon the following errors for a reversal of the judgment:
1. The trial court erred in making that portion of
its Findings of Fact set forth in Paragraph 3 thereof:
"3. That the said David J. Campbell was
not the duly authorized agent of the said defendant and that the said plain tiff did not sell the said
electrical supplies and furnish the said labor to
D·avid J. Campbell as the duly authorized agent
of the defendant, Susan M. Campbell, but sold
said electrical supplies and furnished said labor

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to David J. Can1pbell and relied solely upon the
credit of David J. l~runpbell.''
2. ·The trial court erred in 1naking its Conclusion of
Law that:
''1. '"rhat the said David J. <._;ainpbell was
not acting as the duly authorized agent of the defendant, Susan l\1. Canlp·bell",
and
••2. That the defendant is entitled to a judgment of no cause for action''.
3. That the trial court erred In entering its
judgment:
"That the defendant have judgment against the
plaintiff no cause for a·ction.''

STATEMENT OF POINT INVOLVED
The evidence clearly shows that David J. Campbell
was the agent of the defendant in contracting with plaintiff for the work expended and materials furnished and
installed on the premises of the defendant.

ARGUMENT
The lien statute of this state is Title 52, Utah Code
Annotated, 1943. It contemplates that a lien may attach
to an owners interest in property for labor performed
or lllaterials furnished at the instance of an agent of the
owner.
a~

Utah Code Annotated, 1943, Section 52-1-3, provides
follows:
7
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'' 52-1-3. WHO ENTITLED-ATT·ACHES TO
OWNER'S INTEREST- LIEN ON
O·RES MINED.
Contractors, subcontractors and all persons
performing labor upon, or furnishing materials
to be used in, the construction or alteration of, or
·addition to, or repair of, any building, structure
or improvement upon land; all foundry ·men and
boiler makers; all persons performing labor or
furnishing materials for the construction, repairing of carrying on of any mill, manufactory or
hoisting works; all persons who shall do work or
furnish materials for the prospecting, development, preservation or working of any mining
claim, mine, quarry, oil or gas well, or deposit;
and licensed architects and engineers and artisans
who have furnished designs, plats, plans, n1aps,
specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have rendered
other like professional service, or bestowed labor,
shall have· a lien upon the property upon or concerning which they have rendered service, performed labor or furnished materials, for the value
of the service rendered, labor performed or materials furnished by each respectively, whether at
the insbarnce of the ow~er o,r of amy other person
actimg by his authority as agent, contr"actor or
otherwise. Such liens shall attach only to such interest as the owner may have in the property, but
the interest of a lessee of a mining claim, mine or
deposit, whether working under bond or otherwise, shall for the purposes of this chapter include products mined and exeavated while the
same remain upon the premises included within
the lease. ''
An agency between the owner of property and an
agent who contracts with one who performs labor and
furnishes 1naterial so as to create a mechanic's lien
8
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ngnin~t

the property, is established in the sa1ne \vay as
any other agency nnd. the following quotation fron1 the
ea~e of Belnap v. Condon ~3-± Utah 213, 97 Pacific 111, is
enlightening- :

''If, therefore, the person furnishing n1aterial \vhic.h is purchased for the improv,ement of
certain property, can show that the purchaser of
the 1naterial \Vas the agent of the real owner of
the property, the ag~ency 1nay be established in
such a case precisely as it may be in any other
case but the evidence in such a case must establish agency. ' '
'

...:ill action to foreclose a Inechanic's lien is by the
\Veight of authority an equitable proceedings. Section
3625, pages -±839 and 4840, \r olume 5, Bancroft's Code
Practice and Remedies, citing numerous cases including
cases from Colorado, from which state our law was
taken together with the construction placed thereon by
the Colorado courts. ·See page 531 Volume 3, Utah Code
Annotated, 1943. This, therefore, being an equity case
this court should review the facts and direct findings to
be made in accordance with the facts as interpreted by
this court.
Appellant contends that the facts show that David
J. Can1pbell was agent of the defendant in dealing with
plaintiff, in securing plaintiff-'s services and materials
to be placed in the building of defendant.
David eT. Campbell did not disclose that he was an
agent for defendant and plaintiff c.harged job to David
J. (\uupbell of who1n plaintiff made demand for pay9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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111ent and plaintiff did not know that defendant was the
principal until after the work was completed and he attempted to file a lien. This does not defeat plaintiff's
right to hold defendant and foreclose its lien. An undisclosed principal is bound bythe acts of her agent within
the scope of his authority in the course of his employluent. 2 Corpus Juris Section 522 on Agency, page 840:
PRINCIP AL~(l)
IN GENERAL. As has he~en seen in another connection, an. agent who enters in to contractual relations on behalf of an undisclosed principal may
be held liable by the person with whom he deals,
as though he himself were in fact the principal.
The· liability of the agent is not, however, exclusive, for, although the third person extended
credit to the agent in ignorance of the fact that
the latter was acting in a representative capacity,
he may elect to hold the undisclosed principal
when discovered, it being a firmly established rule
that an undisclosed principal is bound by executory simple contracts made by the agent, and by
acts done by the agent in relation thereto, within
the scope of his authority and in the course of
his employment, although the contract purports
to he the individual contract of the agent, and although the third person had previously refused
to enter into contractual relations with the principal.
'' 522.

UNDIS·CL·O~S:ED

This rule applies only where the person
sought to be held as undisclosed principal was not
known to 'be a party to the transaction at the tin1e
thereof, but it is not dependent upon the dilig~ence
of the third person in discovering the fact of the
concealed agency.
Applies to written or oral contracts. The rule
of liability of an undisclosed principal applies as
10
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well to a si1nple contract in writing as to an oral
contract, although the \\'ritten contract is such
that it is required to be in \vriting by the statute
of frauds.
Executed contract. But the principal is not
liable upon a contract \Yhich has been fully executed by the agent.''
In the case of Hollywood Holding and Development
Corporation v. Os\vald, California 1931, 5 Pacific 2d 9·6·3,
an lmdisclosed principal was held liable for the cost of
putting in a road in front of property purchased in the
nau1e of an agent. The court said at page 964:
·'The rule is well established that the contract of an agent who deals in his own name without disclosing that of his principal, is the contract
of the principal.''
A review of the evidence will show that defendant
by her lack of management of the property, in permitting
her husband to take and assume complete control over
it and in exercising no control whatsoever over the prop·erty herself, made her husband her agent so that when
he dealt with plaintiff the defendant became responsible
for the debt created.
Agency may be implied from course of dealing and
habits of particular parties. Mechem on Agency, 2nd Edition, Section 717. It may also arise from ratification by
a('qniescence coupled with conduct inconsistent with disapproval. .Thfechem on Agency, 2nd Edition, Section 471.
Like\\Tise it may arise by failure to descent. Mechem on
i\gen(·~T' 2nd Edition, Sections 459, 460, 461 and 462. It
11
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also may be shown by proof of agency on other occasions.
Mechern on Agency, 2nd Edition, Section 260.
As. stated in 40 Corpus Juris Mechanics' Liens, Section 87, pages 99 and 100 the wife's property may be
subject to a lien under a contract of improvement entered into by the husband where she has "expressly o~
iinpliedly authorized the husband to contract as her
agent or has held him out as her agent or has subsequent}~~ ratified his act.''
Conversely as stated in the same citation "The rule
that the wife's property is not subject to a mechanic's
lien under a contract with the husband is especially applicable where the contract or improvem·ent is 1nade
against her protest even though her protest is made to
the husband and not to the person furnishing the material.''
Cited in support of this statement is the Utah case
of ~lorrison, Merrill & Company, Respondents, v. Hardie
L. Clark, Appellant, 20 Utah 4·32·, (1899) 59 Pacific 235
and respondent relied on this ~ase in the trial -court and
it was by reason of this case that the court ordered judgn1ent for the defendant.
In the case of Caldwell v. Overall, Okl. ( 1940) 99
Pacific 2d 49'6, the court sustained a 1ien against the
wife's property and stated as follows:
''The sole question involved is whether the
evidence was sufficient to show that defendant's
12
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husband, \vho en1ployed plaintiff to do the \vork,
\Vas defendant's agent. \J\T t• have carefully exrunined the record and are of the opinion that the
agency of the husband is thereby sufficiently established. \Vithout going into detail, it is sufficient to say that the facts and circumstances
sho,vn, as \Yell as the ad1nissions of the defendant,
lead to the conclusion that the \York was done for
her, and that she knew that plaintiff had been en1ployed for such purpos·e by the husband, and accepted his services \Vith such knowledge.
It is settled that before a lien can be established against real estate, the contract must be
Inade 'vith the o'vner or his duly authorized agent,
and that the right to the lien depends on such contract. Deka D·evelop·ment Co. v. Fox, 1934, 170
·Okl. 228, 3.9 P. 2d 143. While the husband's
authority to act for his wife is not implied from
the 1narital relation, nor 'from the mere fact that
he occupied, or managed and controlled, his wife's
property, yet in many instances the agency of the·
hus'band is inferred from the circumstances, as
when the wife knew that the lien claimant was
working on the building, and personally gave him
directions as to parts of the work, when she participated in conversations between the contractors
and her husband relative to the work while it was
being done, or when she furnished what money
was paid on some material and the building of
the house. ''
The ~lorrison, 1ferrill and Company v. Hardie L.
Clark case is clearly distinguishable from the pres·ent
case. The facts in the Clark case are:
'''That J. W. Clark, defendant's husband, contracted in writing for himself alone and on his
own behalf to build the house on the lot in ques13
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tion, which, in fact, belonged to his wife, and that
he was not the agent of his wife. It further appears that defendant, Hardie L. Clark, knew that
J. W. Clark had made the written contract, lived
on the land and knew the work in constructing
the hous·e was going on; that she did not prevent
the erection of the building and never consented
that her land should be liable on the contract for
labor or material or otherwise. That she disagreed
with her husband about constructing the house
on this lot and wanted it erected on land in California and objected and protested against the
building of the house on her land and that he
built the house against her objection and over
her protest and she never consented thereto. During all this tilne and up to the completion of the
house she believed, and he was, in fact, financially
able to pay for the labor and materials so furnished, he was not her agent in any such matter
and had no right, title or interest in the land on
which the house was constructed. The contract was
not m·ade by her or on her behalf and she agreed
to none of the terms, conditions or agreements
thereof.'' 20 Utah Pages 439 & 440.
In the Clark case the wife objected to what the husband was doing with her property. In this case she did
not object and acquiessed in his doing as he wanted with
the property and, in fact, signed an agreement by which
the property was to be re1nodeled during the same time
that the last of the electrical work was being done. Mrs.
Campbell had no interest in what was done with the
property and the only reason it was in her name was
because her husband had no credit rating.
In the Clark case Mrs. Clark believed that her hus14
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band \Yas and he \Yas, in fact, financially able to pay
for the labor and 1naterials furnished \Yhile in this case
j[r~. Campbell kne\v that her husband was financially
e1nbarra~8ed

and unable to pay for the work and nlaterials furnished.
In the Clark case there \\~as nothing from which an
agency bet\Yeen husband and wife could he inferred while
in this ease ~frs. Crunpbell permitted her husband to
use and handle the property as his own, collect the rents,
repair and ren1odel it and negotiate for the sale of the
::;t~lne and the only thing that she did was to sign necessary papers \vhen they were presented to her for signature and she even objected to having the prop·erty placed
in her name.

Under the facts and circumstances of the case Appellant submits that ~Irs. Campbell should not now be perInitted to defeat the foreclosure of the lien against the
property which she objected to owning and over which
~he exercised no control but permitted her husband to
exercise for her complete control and management. Mr.
Ca1npbell died without any estate from which plaintiff
111ight recover. Mrs. Campbell's property received the
benefit of plaintiff's labor and materials.
It is submitted that the clear weight of the evidence
in this case is that agency existed between defendant and
her husband and that the findings of the court that an
agency did not exist is clearly against the weight of the
15
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evidence and that the judgment appealed from should
be revers~ed.

Respectfully submitted,

ELLIO,TT W. EVAN S
A ttarney fo:r AIP!p;ellarltt.
1
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